



IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

WILLIAM A. RHODES, III, and
WIJNANT VAN DE GROEP,
individually and derivatively,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SILKROAD EQUITY, LLC,
ANDREW J. FILIPOWSKI,
MATTHEW G. ROSZAK, SILKROAD
INTERACT HOLDING COMPANY
and COLOSSUS, INCORPORATED
d/b/a INTERACT PUBLIC SAFETY
SYSTEMS,

Defendants.

C.A. No. 2133-VCN

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: April 5, 2007

Date Decided: July 11, 2007

Alan J. Stone, Esquire, Mark S. Hurd, Esquire, and Kevin M. Coen, Esquire of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Christian Douglas Wright, Esquire and D. Fon Muttamara-Walker, Esquire of Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Harvey J. Barnett, Esquire and Mitchell H. Macknin, Esquire of Sperling & Slater, P.C., Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for Defendants.

NOBLE, Vice Chancellor

I. INTRODUCTION

An investment entity engaged in conduct that caused a software development firm's change in control and, eventually, a complete transfer of ownership to the investment entity. The software development firm's two original—and, at one time, only—shareholders complain that when the investment entity became the firm's senior creditor, it pursued a course of conduct to pressure the firm to agree to give the investment entity an 80% stake in the firm in exchange for, among other things, the restructuring of certain loan obligations. The firm reluctantly consented to such a deal. Accordingly, the firm and its two sole shareholders entered into an acquisition agreement with the investment entity. As structured, the firm was owned entirely by a holding company, with 80% of the interests in that holding company held by the investment entity and 20% held collectively by the firm's two original shareholders. The parties also entered into a stockholders agreement. That agreement provided the holding company and the investment entity with a repurchase option right should the original shareholders be removed as directors of the holding company.

In this action, the firm's two original shareholders allege that, soon after the execution of these agreements, the investment entity—and the two principals behind the investment entity—initiated a scheme to depress the value of the firm so as to later acquire it at a bargain. The alleged acts in furtherance of this scheme

include loading employees of the investment entity onto the firm's payroll and causing the firm to pay the many personal expenses of the investment entity's two principals. The investment entity would later demand that the firm's two original shareholders agree to a deal in which they would give the investment entity \$3 of preferred shares in the holding company for every \$1 that the firm had borrowed. The original shareholders balked and eventually brought suit in this forum. The investment entity later caused the termination of the two original shareholders from their positions at the firm and exercised the option to purchase their shares. Shortly thereafter, in meetings with firm employees, one of the investment entity's principals stated that one of the firm's original shareholders had written a firm check to himself, perhaps intimating that it had been done improperly.

The two original shareholders in the software development firm bring suit against the holding company, the investment entity and its principals and, as nominal defendants, the software development firm. They allege causes of action based on breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of a North Carolina consumer protection statute, and slander per se, and also seek an accounting. Before the Court is a motion to dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiffs William A. Rhodes, III (“Rhodes”) and Wijnant van de Groep (“van de Groep”), a son-in-law of Rhodes, are former directors, officers, and shareholders of Colossus, Incorporated, which did business as InterAct Public Safety Systems (“InterAct” or “the Company”), a North Carolina software development corporation now solely owned by Defendant SilkRoad InterAct Holding Company (“SilkRoad Holding”).² Founded in 1975, InterAct manufactures, sells, and supports a range of public safety and homeland security products for use in “911,” police, fire, and other public safety dispatch centers. For more than twenty years, the Company introduced an array of successful products. InterAct’s fortunes became even brighter in 1999 when it teamed up with BellSouth, a chief competitor at the time, to distribute integrated workstation equipment. The move paid off handsomely. InterAct’s revenue soared from roughly \$7 million in 1999 to \$30 million in 2003.

To finance the shift in product mix and the new manufacturing demands that came with it, InterAct sought extra working capital and obtained a traditional bank loan of \$5.2 million. In 2003, however, InterAct’s lender was acquired and its new lender, Capital Bank, became impatient. It demanded two things: repayment in full

¹ The Background is drawn from the Amended Verified Complaint (the “Complaint”).

² SilkRoad Holding is a Delaware corporation now wholly owned by Defendant SilkRoad Equity, a Delaware limited liability company.

by InterAct and personal guarantees by Rhodes, van de Groep, and their spouses. As pressure mounted on InterAct to pay off the loan, Rhodes and van de Groep looked for outside equity investors. The equity firm they selected required InterAct to take on a “seasoned CEO” as one of the conditions of its investment. But when the equity firm’s pick pulled out at the last minute, so did the equity firm. Rhodes and van de Groep would eventually come to deal with two individuals: Defendants Andrew J. Filipowski (“Filipowski”) and Matthew G. Roszak (“Roszak”). The Plaintiffs’ control over InterAct—as its only shareholders and directors—would soon change.

Filipowski learned of InterAct’s predicament from a senior partner at the equity firm that had originally planned to invest in InterAct. Shortly thereafter, and without notifying either Rhodes or van de Groep, Filipowski, acting through his company, SilkRoad Equity, LLC (“SilkRoad Equity”),³ bought the InterAct loan with its personal guarantees from Capital Bank.⁴ For InterAct, the practical significance of this transaction was that SilkRoad Equity had become its primary creditor. According to the Complaint, Filipowski and Roszak (*i.e.*, SilkRoad Equity) used this development to their advantage, pressuring Rhodes and van de

³ Filipowski and Roszak own majority and minority equity interests, respectively, in SilkRoad Equity, although their exact allocation is not alleged.

⁴ SilkRoad Equity purchased the loan for \$4.2 million, at a million dollar discount from the balance owed.

Group to agree to transactions by which InterAct would eventually become a wholly-owned subsidiary of SilkRoad Holding.

In October 2004, SilkRoad Equity acquired 80% of the equity in InterAct—with Rhodes and van de Groep retaining 12% and 8%, respectively—in exchange for a senior note not to exceed \$10 million.⁵ In December of that year, the parties also entered into a stockholders agreement (the “Stockholders Agreement”). Under the agreement, InterAct’s board would have seven members: Rhodes, van de Groep, and five designees of SilkRoad Equity. Rhodes and van de Groep’s seats, however, were conditioned on their employment with InterAct.⁶ The agreement also provided SilkRoad Holding and SilkRoad Equity with options to purchase Rhodes and van de Groep’s shares for “fair market value” if they were to be removed as directors.⁷

Rhodes and van de Groep bring this suit against the SilkRoad-related entities, InterAct, and both Filipowski and Roszak.⁸ They allege that almost

⁵ The note included the \$5.2 million face value of the loan that SilkRoad Equity had acquired.

⁶ On December 20, 2004, at the time the Stockholders Agreement was executed, Rhodes and van de Groep also entered into employment agreements with InterAct whereby Rhodes would serve as Executive Vice Chairman and van de Group as President. Filipowski became InterAct’s new Executive Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, and Roszak became the Chief Financial Officer.

⁷ Under the Stockholders Agreement, “fair market value” was to be determined by SilkRoad Holding’s board. If the director refused to tender his shares, they would be deemed transferred under the agreement.

⁸ Although the Plaintiffs make clear in their briefing that they are not seeking to assert derivative claims, their caption title in this action states that they are bringing suit both “individually and derivatively.”

immediately after SilkRoad Equity gained a majority stake (80%) in InterAct, Filipowski and Roszak embarked upon a scheme to depress the value of the Company in order to purchase Rhodes and van de Groep's remaining shares at a significant discount.

By way of example, they point out that Filipowski and Rhodes added more than a dozen SilkRoad Equity employees to InterAct's payroll within the first few months of 2005. Contributing little or no economic benefit to InterAct, these employees cost the Company more than \$5 million in salaries and other expenses. The Plaintiffs also cite SilkRoad Holding's acquisition of TrueSentry, an entity owned by SilkRoad Equity, as evidence of the Defendants' self-dealing, not least of all because numerous TrueSentry employees were shifted to InterAct's payroll.

A common theme running through the Complaint is that Filipowski and Roszak excluded the Plaintiffs from key decisions concerning the Company, while at the same time running the Company from afar and only occasionally descending upon Asheville, North Carolina, the Company's principal place of business. The Plaintiffs allege that they were denied a say in critical decisions involving InterAct, such as the Company's development of a "next generation product" with other SilkRoad Equity portfolio companies and its taking on of new debt obligations, among other reasons, to pay down certain InterAct's loans from SilkRoad Equity and finance management fees to SilkRoad Equity. They allege that Filipowski and

Roszak denied them access to InterAct's accounting system and to information on licenses held by the Company. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs allege that Filipowski and Roszak caused InterAct not only to pay themselves exorbitant consulting fees and extremely generous severance packages but also to cover an expanding array of personal travel and entertainment expenses.

By February 2006, SilkRoad Equity had requested that Rhodes and van de Groep agree to a deal whereby \$3 of preferred InterAct shares would be issued to SilkRoad Equity for every dollar that had been borrowed by InterAct. Filipowski and Roszak were not coy as to how much they wanted Rhodes and van de Groep to agree to the terms. They would exert pressure on the Plaintiffs by refusing to pay quarterly interest and principal repayment on one of InterAct's more onerous loans, a loan through the Bank of Asheville guaranteed personally by Rhodes; refusing to pay InterAct's federal payroll taxes; and withholding funds earmarked for employees' 401(k) accounts. Rhodes and van de Groep were given until May 5, 2006, to agree to the deal. On that day, however, they chose instead to bring an action before this Court. Three days later, they were fired.⁹

Following the terminations, the Defendants exercised their option under the Stockholders Agreement to buy the Plaintiffs' shares. The Plaintiffs received

⁹ Rhodes and van de Groep's status as directors was also apparently terminated on May 12, 2006, although they maintain that they never received "prompt" notice of such removal as required by Section 228 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.

\$1.516 million, which they consider inadequate and a product of a flawed valuation effort by Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin (“Houlihan”), SilkRoad Holding’s financial advisor. They also allege that Filipowski explained during meetings with more than 200 InterAct employees that van de Groep, acting through InterAct, had written a \$50,000 check to himself.

III. CONTENTIONS

Rhodes and van de Groep’s seven-count Complaint alleges direct causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, violation of North Carolina trade practices law, slander per se, and conduct by Filipowski and Roszak meriting an accounting of InterAct.

In Count One and Count Four, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by engaging in self-dealing transactions (*e.g.*, loading SilkRoad Equity employees onto InterAct’s payroll, using InterAct funds for personal expenses of Filipowski and Rhodes, causing SilkRoad Holding to acquire TrueSentry) designed to cripple InterAct, depress the Plaintiffs’ stake in the Company, and enable the Defendants to acquire it cheaply. Count Two and Count Three concern breach of oral and written contracts. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants disregarded an oral assurance the Defendants gave them at the time SilkRoad Equity became an investor in InterAct, specifically that they would direct excess cash flow to certain loans that the Plaintiffs had personally

guaranteed payment. The Plaintiffs also allege that the Defendants breached an obligation under the Stockholders Agreement to purchase their shares in SilkRoad Holding at “fair market value.” In Count Five, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants’ conduct in connection with their acquisition of InterAct violated the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act. In Count Six, the Plaintiffs bring a claim for slander per se, alleging that Filipowski made defamatory statements to more than 200 InterAct employees regarding van de Groep’s writing a check to himself from Company funds. Finally, the Plaintiffs seek an accounting in light of the alleged fiduciary duty violations of the Defendants.

Defendants Filipowski, Roszak, SilkRoad Equity, SilkRoad Holding, and InterAct collectively seek dismissal under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). First, they argue that the Plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claims under Count One and Count Four should be dismissed because they are derivative in nature and that the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring such claims. Second, they ask the Court to conclude that the contract claims under Count Two and Count Three should be dismissed because one alleges an oral agreement that is barred by an integration clause and the other alleges certain Defendants breached the Stockholders Agreement when they were not even parties to that agreement. Third, as to the claim under North Carolina trade practices law, the Defendants maintain that it is inconsistent with the purpose and scope of the pertinent statute and that, in any

event, the Plaintiffs cannot establish any of its required elements. Fourth, in response to the slander per se claim, the Defendants attack the Plaintiffs' conclusory pleading and argue that, at minimum, they are entitled to a more definitive statement of the claim in order to properly respond. Finally, the Defendants argue that the claim for accounting should be dismissed because it is premised on invalid claims for breach of fiduciary duty.

IV. ANALYSIS

As noted, the Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss will be granted if it appears with reasonable certainty that, under any set of facts that could be proven to support the claims asserted, the Plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief.¹⁰ This standard of review requires the Court to accept the well-pleaded facts alleged in the Complaint as true and to view those facts, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.¹¹ It does not, however, compel acceptance of legal conclusions or every strained interpretation of fact

¹⁰ See *VLIW Tech., L.L.C. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.*, 840 A.2d 606, 610-11 (Del. 2003). It is not necessary to assess whether this “plaintiff-friendly” standard will continue as the proper formulation for motions to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). See *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, --U.S.--, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1968-69 (2007).

¹¹ E.g., *Anglo Am. Sec. Fund, L.P. v. S.R. Global Int'l Fund, L.P.*, 829 A.2d 143, 148-49 (Del. Ch. 2003). The Court may also consider documents integral to the Complaint. *Id.* at 149. Accordingly, the Court at times makes reference to the Contribution and Stock Purchase Agreement and the Stockholders Agreement.

offered by the Complaint.¹² Guided by this familiar standard, the Court moves to the issues raised by the motion.

A. *The Fiduciary Duty Claims Under Count One and Count Four*

Rhodes and van de Groep first assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty. The claims are related. They pertain to a handful of self-dealing transactions—*e.g.*, padding InterAct’s payroll with SilkRoad Equity employees, causing InterAct to acquire a SilkRoad Equity entity, and using InterAct funds for Filipowski and Roszak’s personal expenses and massive severance packages—that were part of a larger effort to diminish Rhodes and van de Groep’s interests in SilkRoad Holding to a level where the Defendants could acquire them at a discount.¹³ The Defendants seek dismissal of these claims by arguing, first, that they are derivative claims and, second, that the Plaintiffs lost standing to assert the claims when they ceased to be shareholders of SilkRoad Holding.

Whether a fiduciary duty claim is direct or derivative generally requires that two questions be asked: “[w]ho suffered the alleged harm—the corporation or the suing stockholder individually—and who would receive the benefit of the recovery

¹² *In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S'holder Litig.*, 897 A.2d 162, 168 (Del. 2006).

¹³ Count One addresses several matters, including the acquisition of TrueSentry, a former SilkRoad Holding entity. Count Four is limited to the TrueSentry acquisition. The purpose for a separate Count Four is not readily apparent. It is, however, sufficient for present purposes to note that (1) Count One may fairly be viewed as subsuming Count Four and (2) the two counts will be assessed here together.

or other remedy?”¹⁴ If the answer to both of these questions is “the corporation,” then the claim is derivative. Conversely, to state a direct claim, “[t]he stockholder must demonstrate that the duty breached was owed to the stockholder and that he or she can prevail without showing an injury to the corporation.”¹⁵ The consequences of classification of a claim as either direct or derivative can be outcome determinative. For example, if a stockholder no longer owns her shares, whether because of merger or sale, she loses standing to pursue a derivative claim on behalf of the corporation.¹⁶

In this instance, the self-dealing allegedly committed by the Defendants harmed SilkRoad Holding—unnecessary and improvident dissipation of corporate assets—and the proper remedy would be to restore the ill-gotten gains to the corporation. Thus, the Plaintiffs have stated a derivative claim and, of course, they are no longer stockholders of InterAct. Moreover, any harm which the Plaintiffs can identify was suffered by the corporation; under any of their theories, SilkRoad Holding was also harmed by the challenged conduct.

¹⁴ *Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.*, 845 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Del. 2004).

¹⁵ *Id.* at 1039.

¹⁶ *Lewis v. Anderson*, 477 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 1984). There are limited exceptions. *See Kramer v. W. Pacific Indus., Inc.*, 546 A.2d 348, 354-55 (Del. 1988) (noting that the two exceptions are “(i) if the merger itself is the subject of a claim of fraud, being perpetrated merely to deprive shareholders of the standing to bring a derivative action; or (ii) if the merger is in reality merely a reorganization which does not affect plaintiff’s ownership in the business enterprise”); *Lewis*, 477 A.2d at 1046 n.10.

That might be the end of the analysis if a claim can only be either direct or derivative. There are, however, circumstances which may form the basis for both direct claims and derivative claims. This is one of those instances, and, thus, the Plaintiffs' claims set forth in Count One and Count Four of the Amended Complaint survive.¹⁷ Although the corporation may be harmed, there are times when the consequences of that harm fall disproportionately upon minority stockholders. As set forth in *Gentile v. Rossette*,¹⁸

There is, however, at least one transactional paradigm—a species of corporate overpayment claim—that Delaware case law recognizes as being both derivative and direct in character. A breach of fiduciary duty claim having this dual character arises where: (1) a stockholder having majority or effective control causes the corporation to issue “excessive” shares of its stock in exchange for assets of the controlling stockholder that have a lesser value; and (2) the exchange causes an increase in the percentage of the outstanding shares owned by the controlling stockholder, and a corresponding decrease in the share percentage owned by the public (minority) shareholders.¹⁹

The Plaintiffs' claims, of course, do not fit snugly within this “transactional paradigm,” but they do allege that SilkRoad Equity, as the controlling shareholder, sold assets it owned (or controlled) to the corporation for greater than fair value (and intentionally imposed other unnecessary burdens on the corporation) for the

¹⁷ The Defendants have not argued otherwise that these counts fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; their contentions exclusively depend upon the Plaintiffs' loss of standing, as former stockholders, to assert derivative claims.

¹⁸ 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006).

¹⁹ *Id.* at 99-100 (citations omitted); see also *In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litig.*, 634 A.2d 319 (Del. 1993).

sole purpose of driving down the value of the corporation and driving out the Plaintiffs. As a result, Filipowski and Roszak (through SilkRoad Equity) became the sole owners of SilkRoad Holding when they acquired all of the remaining shares (as a consequence of contractual terms requiring that Rhodes and van de Groep sell their shares on termination of employment) that they did not previously hold. More particularly, Filipowski and Roszak caused a direct harm to the Plaintiffs by the “extraction” of economic value and residual voting power and a “redistribution” of the economic value and voting power to themselves as controlling shareholders.²⁰ In addition, the Court’s inquiry is not restricted to the abstract structuring of the transaction or course of conduct under scrutiny. Instead, the Court must focus on the “true substantive effect” of the challenged transaction.²¹

If the alleged facts supporting the claims are taken as true, they allow the Court to infer that the Defendants’ actions had the “true substantive effect” of harming the Plaintiffs, as minority shareholders in SilkRoad Holding, in substantially different fashion from SilkRoad Equity (*i.e.*, Filipowski and Roszak), as controlling shareholder. With the allegations made in Count One and Count Four—*e.g.*, loading InterAct with SilkRoad Equity employees, using InterAct funds for SilkRoad Equity’s other companies, causing SilkRoad Holding to acquire

²⁰ See *Gentile*, 906 A.2d at 100.

²¹ *Gatz v. Ponsoldt*, --A.2d--, 2007 WL 1120338, at *11 (Del. Apr. 16, 2007).

a SilkRoad Equity entity—it cannot be said, in the words of *Gatz*, that the Court should view these transactions as “confined to an equal dilution of the economic value . . . of each of the corporation’s outstanding shares.” Those alleged to have benefited directly from the Defendants’ misdeeds are Filipowski and Roszak or entities controlled by them. Thus, SilkRoad Equity, as controlling shareholder, would not have suffered harm to the same extent and proportion as the Plaintiffs. Moreover, the Defendants’ alleged breaches of fiduciary duty may readily be viewed as facilitating their efforts to drive out the Plaintiffs at a bargain price. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the fiduciary duty claims alleged in the Complaint can be brought as direct claims and that the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts One and Four should be denied.

B. The Breach of Contract Claims Under Count Two and Count Three

Two contract claims are offered in the Complaint. First, in Count Two, the Plaintiffs allege the Defendants breached an oral obligation to apply excess funds to loans for which the Plaintiffs had personally guaranteed. Second, in Count Three, the Plaintiffs cite a provision in the Stockholders Agreement as having been breached by a faulty valuation of SilkRoad Holding that was used in acquiring the Plaintiffs’ shares.

1. The Stock Purchase Agreement's Integration Clause

The Complaint alleges, and the Court must accept as true, that certain oral commitments were made by Filipowski and Roszak at the time they (through SilkRoad Equity) became InterAct investors to direct excess cash flow to those loans that the Plaintiffs and their spouses had personally guaranteed repayment. Instead, as alleged by the Complaint, once the Defendants gained control of InterAct following execution of the Contribution and Stock Purchase Agreement (the "Acquisition Agreement"), they caused funds to be used for other purposes. The Plaintiffs now claim that the Defendants breached their oral agreement.

Collectively, the Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim by reference to the Acquisition Agreement. More precisely, they point to Section 11.6, which provides:

Complete Agreement. This Agreement, the related schedules, and the other documents delivered by the parties in connection with this Agreement, together with the Confidentiality Agreement, contain the complete agreement between the parties with respect to the transactions contemplated by this Agreement and supersede all prior agreements and understandings between the parties to this Agreement.

They argue that this section precludes, as a matter of law, the oral assurances that Filipowski or Roszak may have made prior to the parties reducing their understanding to written form.

Section 11.6 operates plainly as an integration clause.²² Notwithstanding its unambiguous nature and seemingly comprehensive scope, the Plaintiffs have two main protestations. Both are, however, without merit.

They first complain that the clause is only a partial integration clause and, therefore, it is appropriate for the Court to look outside the four corners of the Acquisition Agreement for evidence of the Defendants' oral agreement. Specifically, they assert that the Acquisition Agreement fails to make critical reference to either the Bank of Asheville loan guaranteed by Rhodes or to a particular note given to Rhodes from InterAct, which was part of the consideration for SilkRoad Equity's acquisition. That assertion, however, is refuted by some notable references in the Acquisition Agreement. For example, Article XII defines "InterAct Debt" as including "all indebtedness for borrowed money," "guarantees," and "all amounts payable by InterAct." As to the note given to Rhodes by InterAct, that note is expressly referenced both at Section 1.3, which provides the note is in "full consideration for the Rhodes Sold Shares and in partial consideration for the covenants not to compete," and at Section 2.4(a), which

²² See *Carrow v. Arnold*, 2006 WL 3289582, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2006) (noting that "a presumption of integration" is created when a clause states that the written contract is intended to be the parties' final agreement). In determining if the Acquisition Agreement, through its integration clause, is "fully integrated," the Court would give particular attention to whether it is "carefully and formally drafted," if it "addresses the questions that would naturally arise out of the subject matter," and if it "expresses the final intentions of the parties." *Hynansky v. Vietri*, 2003 WL 21976031, at *3 (Aug. 7, 2003) (citation omitted). Only the last two considerations appear to be implicated by the parties' briefing on the motion before the Court.

provides that delivery of the note to Rhodes shall be made at closing. The Bank of Asheville loan appears not only to be included in Article XII's definition of "InterAct Debt," but is also referenced indirectly in Section 3.14(h) ("Each trust indenture, mortgage, promissory note, loan agreement, letter of credit, or other Contract for the borrowing of money . . .") and more directly in Schedule 3.14 to the Acquisition Agreement.

The Plaintiffs also argue that the integration clause is unavailing for the Defendants because the contract of which it is part was, itself, induced by fraud and part of a bad faith scheme by the Defendants to depress the value of InterAct. Integration clauses do not, as a matter of law, bar claims of fraud and the presumption afforded by such clauses can also be rebutted upon a showing of bad faith.²³ That said, the problem with the Plaintiffs' attempt to invoke the "fraud" or "bad faith" exceptions to the integration clause at hand is that no allegations of fraudulent or bad faith conduct have been sufficiently alleged in Complaint.²⁴ In fact, the Complaint does not even state that they were defrauded by the Defendants. Even if it did, however, the Court cannot ignore the absence of

²³ See e.g., *Kronenberg v. Katz*, 872 A.2d 568, 592-93 (Del. Ch. 2004). Only explicit "anti-reliance" language—that is, a contractual commitment by a party that it has not relied upon statements outside of the contract's four corners in deciding to consent—would appear to have a claim preclusive effect. See *id.*; see also *Progressive Int'l Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 2002 WL 1558382, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2002). No such language in the Acquisition Agreement, however, can be found.

²⁴ Court of Chancery Rule 9(b) demands, of course, that claims of fraud be pleaded with particularity.

allegations that the Plaintiffs specifically *relied*—reliance being an essential element for a fraud claim—on certain oral commitments of Filipowski and Roszak when deciding to consent to the Acquisition Agreement. That there were once oral commitments by the Defendants different from those commitments made and later reduced to writing is inapposite. As this Court recently observed, “[i]f the only showing required to invoke the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule were inconsistent prior oral statements, such oral statements would often (usually) be admitted, and the exception would swallow the rule.”²⁵ Moreover, the Plaintiffs’ “bad faith” argument—that the oral agreement should be spared from the sweep of the integration clause at Section 11.3 because of a “bad faith” scheme by the Defendants to acquire Rhodes and van de Groep’s interest in InterAct after having driven down its value—is unsupported by the Complaint, which actually states that Filipowski and Rhodes began their scheme *after* SilkRoad Equity became an investor in InterAct.²⁶

²⁵ *Carrow*, 2006 WL 3289582, at *8. It has also been said that prior oral promises usually do not provide enough support to find exception to the parol evidence rule, but certain circumstances—such as a promisor’s “sharp practice” of knowing that the promisee will not notice or understand the significance of a last minute change or the preclusive effect of an integration clause—may permit use of such an exception. *Id.* at *9. Notably, however, no facts have been alleged in the Complaint to suggest that the Plaintiffs did not fully appreciate the effect that Section 11.6 had on the oral promise to pay down a specific loan out of excess funds.

²⁶ *See* Am. Compl. ¶ 30.

In short, nothing is alleged in the Complaint to suggest that the integration clause does not properly bar certain oral commitments the Defendants made prior to execution of the Acquisition Agreement.

2. Parties to the Stockholders Agreement and the Obligation to Pay Fair Market Value for Terminated Employees' Shares

Next, the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants breached the repurchase option provision under the Stockholders Agreement to purchase their shares at fair market value. They complain that the valuation methods employed by Houlihan, SilkRoad Holding's advisor, failed to account for, among other things, the funds that Filipowski and Roszak directed from InterAct to SilkRoad Equity-based interests, as well as the numerous inaccuracies that prevented a proper and fair assessment of the value of their SilkRoad Holding shares. As read, the claim contained in Count Three of the Plaintiffs' Complaint is against all of the named Defendants. That claim, however, can only properly stand against one party: SilkRoad Holding.

A primary flaw of the Plaintiffs' claim is that it names parties who were never signatories to the underlying agreement between the Plaintiffs and SilkRoad Holding and SilkRoad Equity, namely, Filipowski, Roszak, and InterAct. To permit this claim to proceed as against these parties would be to contravene that axiomatic expression found within our law: non-parties to a contract ordinarily

have no obligations under it.²⁷ The Plaintiffs have agreed to dismiss Count Three as against Filipowski and Roszak.²⁸ They have also agreed to dismiss their claim against SilkRoad Equity, even though it was a party to the Stockholders Agreement.²⁹ They continue, however, to bring the claim against InterAct, but that claim cannot stand because, as already discussed, InterAct was never a party to the Stockholders Agreement.

Thus, the only Defendant which can properly be found to have been obligated under the Stockholders Agreement is SilkRoad Holding. SilkRoad Holding has declined, however, to join its co-Defendants in moving for dismissal. Accordingly, except as to SilkRoad Holding, the Court will grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim under Count Three.

²⁷ See *Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P.*, 817 A.2d 160, 172 (Del. 2002); *In re Delta Holdings, Inc.*, 2004 WL 1752857, at *8 n.58 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2004); cf. *MetCap Secs. LLC v. Pearl Senior Care, Inc.*, 2007 WL 1498989, at*7 (Del. Ch. May 16, 2007) (“Well-settled within precepts of contract law is recognition that non-parties to a contract ordinarily have no rights under it.”).

²⁸ See Pls.’ Ans. Br at 3 n.1.

²⁹ *Id.* The claim against SilkRoad Equity would, of course, fail on a different ground. Section 5.6 of the Stockholders Agreement provides “the Board shall reasonably determine in good faith the ‘Fair Market Value’” of the Plaintiffs’ interests in SilkRoad Holding upon termination of their employment. References to “the Board” in Section 5.6 refer exclusively to SilkRoad Holding’s Board of Directors. See Stockholders Agmt. at ¶ 1.2 (defining “Board”). Thus, the obligation to repurchase Rhodes and van de Groep’s stock was, at all times, that of SilkRoad Holding. As a matter of contract, SilkRoad Equity was neither slated to make a valuation of Rhodes and van de Groep’s shares nor obligated to repurchase them.

C. *The Claim Under North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act*

The Court now turns to the Plaintiffs’ claim under the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (the “UDTPA”),³⁰ which provides a private right of action for consumers aggrieved by certain business practices.³¹ To state a claim under the UDTPA, the Plaintiffs must allege that (1) the Defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) this act or practice was “in or affecting commerce,” and (3) the act or practice has proximately caused their injuries.³²

The Plaintiffs invoke the UDTPA in the context of the Defendants’ conduct leading up to the acquisition of InterAct. They allege that SilkRoad Equity (*i.e.*, Filipowski and Roszak) used its position as a senior creditor to pressure InterAct into a transaction with terms disproportionately benefiting SilkRoad Equity.³³ One of the more notable actions alleged to have been taken by SilkRoad Equity is its threat to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against InterAct if it did not agree to a deal whereby SilkRoad Equity would acquire an equity stake in the Company.

³⁰ N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75–1.1 *et seq.* (2001).

³¹ N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75–16 (providing a right of action); *see Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc.*, 331 S.E.2d 677, 680 (N.C. 1985) (recognizing the legislative intent to provide “aggrieved consumers” with a new, private right of action beyond traditional common law claims).

³² *Dalton v. Camp*, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (N.C. 2001).

³³ *See Am. Compl.* ¶¶ 23-27.

There is no real disagreement as to the UDTPA’s cardinal purpose: it is to protect “the consuming public” from those acts done in violation of its general proscriptions.³⁴ Disagreement does arise, however, as to its scope. A threshold question that is raised by Defendants’ motion to dismiss is whether the UDTPA’s “in or affecting commerce” language covers Defendants’ conduct in connection with its transaction with InterAct. In construing this language, North Carolina’s highest court has observed that “while the statutory definition of commerce crosses expansive parameters, it is not intended to apply to all wrongs in a business setting.”³⁵ In this vein, North Carolina has excluded from the UDTPA’s scope those claims involving, among other things, securities transactions,³⁶ most employment-related matters,³⁷ professional services,³⁸ lending or “capital-raising” transactions,³⁹ and internal corporate governance issues.⁴⁰

³⁴ *Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co.*, 333 S.E.2d 236, 241 (N.C. 1985). The statute also has a more aspirational bent to foster “good faith and fair dealing between buyers and sellers.” *Threatt v. Hiers*, 333 S.E.2d 772, 773 (N.C. App. Ct. 1985).

³⁵ *Dalton*, 548 S.E.2d at 711.

³⁶ *See Skinner*, 333 S.E.2d at 241 (holding that “securities transactions are beyond the scope of [the UDTPA]” because the statute is meant to protect the “consuming public” and such transactions are “already subject to pervasive and intricate regulation[s]”).

³⁷ *See, e.g., HAJMM Co. v. House Raeford Farm, Inc.* 403 S.E.2d 483, 492 (N.C. 1991).

³⁸ *See* N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75–1.1(b).

³⁹ *See, e.g., Oberlin Capital, L.P. v. Slavin*, 554 S.E.2d 840, 848 (N.C. App. Ct. 2001); *Garlock v. Hilliard*, 2000 WL 33914616, at *5 (N.C. Super. Aug. 22, 2000).

⁴⁰ *See, e.g., Wilson v. Blue Ridge Elec. Membership Corp.*, 578 S.E.2d 692, 694 (N.C. App. Ct. 2003).

The Defendants argue that their alleged conduct falls outside of the UDTPA's reach because it relates precisely to those areas that North Carolina courts have declined to interpret as being the type of "regular, day-to-day activities" for which businesses "regularly engage[] in and for which [they are] organized."⁴¹ In other words, they argue that the transaction with InterAct was extraordinary in nature and liken it to one involving securities or the transfer of capital.⁴²

In response, the Plaintiffs draw the Court's attention to a North Carolina lower court's decision involving the sale of a company. In *Walker v. Sloan*, it was held that a complaint sufficiently stated a claim under the UDTPA when certain actions were taken by a group of directors to frustrate the sale of the business to a buyout group of plaintiff-employees.⁴³ Actions alleged to have been taken by the resistant director group included being uncooperative in due diligence requests, tempting certain plaintiff-employees to withdraw from the buyout group in exchange for "being taken care of," and terminating employees to bring about

⁴¹ *HAJMM*, 403 S.E.2d at 493.

⁴² In *HAJMM*, the North Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that securities transactions were unlike the regular sale and purchase of consumer goods because such transactions are "extraordinary events . . . related to the creation, transfer, or retirement of capital" and, as such, are not viewed as traditional business activities under the UDTPA. *Id.*

To illustrate the extraordinary nature of SilkRoad's acquisition of InterAct equity, the Defendants point to the various instruments that were executed in connection with that transaction—*e.g.*, the Acquisition Agreement, the Stockholders Agreement, employment agreements for the Plaintiffs, stock certificates, and promissory notes.

⁴³ 529 S.E.2d 236, 243 (N.C. App. Ct. 2000).

instability in efforts to secure outside funding. The Plaintiffs, here, see similarities with *Walker*, contending that, like the directors in *Walker*, the Defendants “took numerous improper actions to manipulate the sale process to suit their own interests.”⁴⁴

Notwithstanding the Court’s observation that *Walker* did nothing to elaborate upon how the alleged acts were deemed to fall within the UDTPA’s “in or affecting commerce” requirement, the guidance from the North Carolina Supreme Court’s seminal decision in *HAJMM Co. v. House Raeford Farm, Inc.*—that “in or affecting commerce” includes those “regular, day-to-day activities” aimed at consumers, but not those extraordinary events in the life of a business—remains firmly rooted in North Carolina law.⁴⁵ That teaching guides this Court to conclude that Defendants’ alleged conduct in connection with the InterAct transaction was not the sort of ordinary conduct that would fall under the UDTPA. Filipowski and Roszak’s acquisition of an 80% interest in InterAct was, not surprisingly, something that occurred outside of the ordinary course.

⁴⁴ Pls.’ Ans. Br. at 37. The factual similarities between *Walker* and here are not as strong as the Plaintiffs would have them. In *Walker*, the directors engaged in undeniably egregious acts. Here, the Complaint alleges little in terms of patently unfair or deceptive conduct. SilkRoad Equity may have placed pressure on Rhodes and van de Groep to consent to terms that they would not have otherwise agreed to in better financial straits, but the Complaint reveals that SilkRoad Equity was acting pursuant to the options it had available to it by contract. *See S. Atl. Ltd. P’ship of Tenn., LP v. Riese*, 284 F.3d 518, 536 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that conduct carried out pursuant to contractual relations rarely violates the [UDTPA]).

⁴⁵ *See, e.g., Wilson*, 578 S.E.2d at 694; *Garlock*, 2000 WL 33914616, at *5 (citing *HAJMM*).

Finally, it should be noted that the two groups of parties to the SilkRoad Equity-InterAct transaction in 2004 had the full benefit of counsel. Ultimately, the parties consented to the Acquisition Agreement. Rhodes and van de Groep may have “reluctantly agreed” to do so,⁴⁶ but the Complaint alleges no facts to suggest that they did not consent freely. That certain terms of the agreement were more favorable to one party at the expense of another, however, is not a matter for the Court to resolve in this context.

In sum, the Court concludes that the alleged conduct here does not fall within the “in or affecting commerce” language of the UDTPA and that, even if it did, it does not constitute unfair or deceptive practice as a matter of law. Accordingly, the claim brought under this statute shall be denied.

D. *Slander Per Se*

Rhodes and van de Groep also bring a claim for slander per se.⁴⁷ In particular, they allege that at “several meetings of InterAct’s more than 200 employees” Filipowski stated that van de Groep “had written a \$50,000 check on

⁴⁶ Am. Comp. ¶ 26.

⁴⁷ Van de Groep previously sought voluntary dismissal of this claim pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 41(a)(2). The Court, however, denied van de Groep’s application because, first, the slander claim was initially, and voluntarily, filed in Delaware and, second, there was a risk of conflicting outcomes if a North Carolina court were to resolve on van de Groep’s slander claim when there was a corresponding counterclaim by InterAct (seeking recovery of \$8,000 for allegedly improper distribution by van de Groep to himself) before this Court. *See Rhodes v. SilkRoad Equity, LLC*, 2007 WL 441940, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2007).

behalf of InterAct to himself.”⁴⁸ They maintain that this statement is false and that it has damaged van de Groep’s business reputation.⁴⁹

As an initial matter, there is a question as to whether this Court should view the Plaintiffs’ claim under Delaware law or, as the Plaintiffs urge, under North Carolina or Georgia law. Besides noting that Filipowski’s statements were made at “several meetings,” there is no indication from the Complaint where these meetings occurred.⁵⁰ That, perhaps, might portend the claim’s general weakness. In any event, it is safe to conclude that these meetings did not occur in Delaware, as InterAct’s offices are only in North Carolina and Georgia. With this in mind, the Court assesses whether Rhodes and van de Groep have sufficiently alleged facts which set forth a defamation claim under North Carolina or Georgia law. Under either formulation, however, the slander per se claim cannot stand.

Under North Carolina law, a claim for slander per se involves the injured party alleging that (1) another has spoken base or defamatory words tending “to prejudice him in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood or hold him up to disgrace, ridicule or contempt; (2) the statement was false; and (3) the statement was published or communicated to and understood by a third

⁴⁸ Am. Compl. ¶ 69.

⁴⁹ *Id.* at ¶¶ 69 (“The allegation that [v]an de Groep wrote himself a \$50,000 check is completely unfounded and it has severely damaged [v]an de Groep’s business reputation, especially in the public safety industry.”), 103-04.

⁵⁰ Likewise, there is no pleading as to when these statements were made by Filipowski or, besides the 200 InterAct employees, to whom.

person.”⁵¹ The claim is put differently in Georgia, but it is substantially similar.⁵² The laws of both states recognize that slander per se is a unique species of defamation. Unlike mere slander, or slander per quod, slander per se need not be accompanied by an allegation and proof of special damages. It is not surprising, then, that “[t]he policy of the law has much restricted the range of defamatory utterances which are actionable per se.”⁵³

To sustain a claim for slander per se, both North Carolina and Georgia law appear to share the view that there must be some showing that the defamatory words spoken were susceptible to but one meaning; importantly, this must be *without* the aid of explanatory circumstances or resort to extrinsic proof.⁵⁴ Put differently, the words must be “recognized as injurious on their face” and cannot

⁵¹ *West v. King’s Dept. Store, Inc.*, 365 S.E.2d 621, 624 (N.C. 1988); *see also Javurek v. Jumper*, 2005 WL 465571, at *3 (noting the three main categories of slander per se: an accusation of a crime involving moral turpitude; an allegation impeaching one in his trade, business, or profession; and an imputation that one has a loathsome disease).

⁵² In Georgia, slander per se includes [i]mputing to another a crime punishable by law,” “[c]harging a person with having some contagious disorder,” or “[m]aking charges against another in reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure him therein.” O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4 (a)(1)-(3).

⁵³ *Donovan v. Fiumara*, 442 S.E.2d 572, 576 (N.C. App. Ct. 1994) (citing *Penner v. Elliott*, 33 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1945)); *accord Chong v. Reeba Constr. Co., Inc.*, 645 S.E.2d 47, 53 (Ga. App. Ct. 2007).

⁵⁴ *See Renwick v. Greensboro Daily News Co.*, 312 S.E.2d 405, 409 (N.C. 1984); *Bellemead, LLC v. Stoker*, 631 S.E.2d 693, 695-96 (Ga. 2006) (holding that it is was inappropriate for a lower court to look to innuendo, or some wider explanatory context, to determine if certain words constituted slander per se).

be assisted by a judicial “hunt for a strained construction in order to hold the words as being defamatory as a matter of law.”⁵⁵

The Plaintiffs’ claim is that van de Groep wrote a check to himself from InterAct. That is all. No allegation has been made that van de Groep was unauthorized to write checks on behalf of InterAct; he was, after all, the Company’s President. No allegation has been made that the intended distribution of InterAct funds was unlawful or for an improper purpose; that may have been the intended message, but claims for slander per se are claims based on statements that were said, not implied.⁵⁶ In short, Filipowski’s comments could have been susceptible to a different interpretation. Without more, the broad brush allegations before the Court provide insufficient support to conclude, as a matter of law, that the statements were subject to only a defamatory understanding.

Another reason why the Plaintiffs’ claim must fail is that it does not sufficiently allege facts that Filipowski’s statement actually impeached van de Groep in the public safety industry.⁵⁷ That is, it is not enough to rely on those

⁵⁵ *Bellemead*, 631 S.E.2d at 695.

⁵⁶ *Cf. Chong*, 645 S.E.2d at 53 (concluding that slander per se could be found where a general contractor was called a “crook” in the context of a discussion about the contractor’s business).

⁵⁷ *See Jolly v. Acad. Collection Serv., Inc.*, 400 F. Supp. 2d 851, 861 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (concluding plaintiffs who generally claimed that certain defendants disrupted their business failed to “set out facts alleging that defendants made false statements *actually impeaching* them in their business” when they neither indicated the nature of their business or alleged that defendants stated they were somehow unfit to conduct such business) (emphasis added); *accord Bellemead*, 631 S.E.2d at 695 (noting alleged statements must have been “especially injurious”) (citation omitted).

statements which “merely injure” a plaintiff’s business, trade, or profession; rather, there must be a showing that certain statements both (1) touched upon the plaintiff’s business, trade, or profession, and (2) were necessarily harmful in their *effect* on a plaintiff’s business, trade, or profession.⁵⁸ Although the Plaintiffs have identified van de Groep as being in the public safety industry,⁵⁹ the allegation that he wrote InterAct checks to himself does not necessarily malign and negatively effect his business, trade, or profession in the industry in such manner as to conclude that he was slandered per se and that special damages need not be alleged.⁶⁰ This is because, as explained earlier, there is no allegation that van de Groep improperly acquired funds from the Company or lacked the authority to even write checks on behalf of the Company.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for slander per se and that the claim must be dismissed.

⁵⁸ *Donovan*, 442 S.E.2d at 578 (citing *Badame v. Lampke*, 89 S.E.2d 466, 468 (N.C. 1955)).

⁵⁹ *Cf. Jolly*, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 861 (holding plaintiffs failed state a claim for slander per se where they never alleged the nature of defendants’ business or trade).

⁶⁰ *Cf. Badame v. Lampke*, 89 S.E.2d 466 (N.C. 1955) (ruling that a business rival’s statement to one of plaintiff’s customers that plaintiff had failed to make a required payment and engaged in “shady deals” was slander per se); *Broadway v. Cope*, 179 S.E. 452 (N.C. 1935) (ruling a butcher had been slandered per se by a competitor’s statement that the butcher had slaughtered a rabid cow).

E. *Accounting*

Rhodes and van de Groep also seek an accounting. An accounting is not so much a cause of action as it is a form of relief.⁶¹ Here, the demand for accounting is inherently dependent on the Court's decision on the fiduciary duty claims in Count One and Count Four. Because the Court views those claims as having been properly stated, it follows that dismissal of the Plaintiffs' request for an accounting is unwarranted.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Count Two (breach of oral agreement) of the Amended Complaint, Count Three (breach of Stockholders Agreement), except as to SilkRoad Holding, Count Five (violation of the North Carolina's trade practices statute), and Count Six (slander per se) will be dismissed. Otherwise, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be denied.

An implementing order will be entered.

⁶¹ See *Albert v. Alex. Brown Mgmt. Servs., Inc.*, 2005 WL 2130607, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2005) ("An accounting is an equitable remedy that consists of the adjustment of accounts between parties and a rendering of a judgment for the amount ascertained to be due to either as a result.").